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Tanzaniaa b s t r a c t
The implementation of the green economy in Tanzania is currently re-arranging space in significant ways.
The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) has been presented by the government
as well as investors and aid donors as a model for the green economy in Africa combining investments in
large-scale farming with environmental conservation. The Kilombero valley is centrally situated within
SAGCOT and has become a national hotspot of land-use conflicts. The valley is dominated by an expand-
ing sector of agricultural capital investments combined with a substantial increase in areas under envi-
ronmental conservation. While some smallholder farmers are dispossessed through these expansions,
others are contracted as outgrowers. Pastoralists are, however, only in the way, and are also thought
to cause widespread environmental degradation. This is a long-held view, which also plays a key role
in the implementation of SAGCOT. It has led to a series of pastoral evictions in the country. In 2012,
‘Operation Save Kilombero’ was implemented consisting of violent evictions of all pastoralists from the
valley. This eviction had been planned to conserve the wetland ecosystem that was seen by the govern-
ment and aid donors to be threatened by pastoral overstocking. The arrival of the green economy in
Kilombero re-enforced the perceived need to clear the valley of livestock and pastoralists to conserve
the environment and make space for investments in agriculture. The pastoral eviction in Kilombero in
2012 was also only one in a series; every eviction leading to the spill-over of pastoralists to other areas
creating new farmer-herder conflicts as well as conservation conflicts. While land-use conflicts in Africa
are commonly thought to be caused by natural resource scarcity and environmental degradation mainly
resulting from population growth, we demonstrate how degradation narratives may themselves be a key
driver of conflicts, in this case to legitimize and pave the way for agricultural investments and environ-
mental conservation under a ‘green economy’.
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
At the Rio + 20 meeting in June 2012, Tanzania’s Minister of
Environment, Tereza Huvisa, introduced the Southern Agricultural
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) as a major new tool for
greening the country’s economy. The Minister was speaking at a
side-event about investing in natural capital, organized by the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Africa Development Bank.
She noted that SAGCOT was planned as an ‘investment blueprint’focusing on profitable agricultural investments, infrastructural
development, and value-chains and human capital development,
combined with the safeguarding of ecosystem services and natural
capital more generally (Bergius, Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2018).
Six months earlier in Tanzania, Minister Huvisa had announced
that all pastoralists within the Kilombero Valley Ramsar Site1 had
to leave the area by August 30, 2012. This new conservation area
covers almost 600,000 acres of the central wetlands in the Kilombero
valley, which again is one of the core areas of SAGCOT. While the
Ramsar site had been officially established in 2002, its implementa-e use of
approxi-
2 M. Bergius et al. /World Development 129 (2020) 104850tion only started in 2012 in parallel to the launching of SAGCOT.
Indeed, evicting pastoralists from the valley was seen by government
and SAGCOT officials as an important measure to prepare for the
implementation of this new investment corridor. On October 30,
2012, ‘Operation Save Kilombero’ started, involving the use of about
400 police officers, national park rangers, soldiers, and prison and
district officers to forcefully evict about 5,000 pastoralists and
small-scale farmers (IWGIA, 2016).
The Regional Commissioner, Joel Bandera, led the operation and
told the Tanzanian press that ‘‘we will not stop until all livestock
keepers and their animals are flushed out from their hiding”, other-
wise Morogoro region would not attain its state-assigned goal of
becoming the national grain reserve through the SAGCOT initiative
(PINGOs Forum, 2013, p. 33)
The implementation of the green economy in Tanzania has in
fact become a tool for the government, international aid donors
and businesses to continue to pursue and further strengthen a pol-
icy to ‘modernize’ agriculture through a focus on large-scale
investments (Bergius et al., 2018; Buseth, 2017). Within the frame-
work of the green economy, such agricultural investments are pro-
moted in tandem with measures to conserve the environment
through the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services. In
this paper, we show how this approach in practice has led to dis-
possessions of smallholder farmers and pastoralists, how these
evictions lead to the spill-over of land-use conflicts to other areas,
and how they are being legitimized through the continued repro-
duction of unsubstantiated degradation narratives.2
The paper draws on several short fieldwork stays in Kilombero
between 2014 and 2018 as well as a longer stay by the first author
for one year in 2016–17. In addition to interviews with govern-
ment officials at national and district levels, land and human rights
activists, conservationists, pastoralists and small-scale farmers,
agricultural investors and aid donors, we also collected data about
land-use conflicts at the district land tribunal and local police as
well as historical data in the Tanzanian National Archives.
While land-use conflicts in Africa are often believed to be
caused by natural resource scarcity and environmental degrada-
tion (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1999, 2007), we demonstrate how land-
use conflicts in Kilombero and connected spaces are instead to a
large extent driven by narratives of degradation, associated
with livestock keeping in particular. This means in practice that
degradation narratives continue to serve to legitimize evictions
for the promotion and creation of green economy spaces.
To contextualize and support this argument, the paper proceeds
with a general discussion of the links between degradation narra-
tives, dispossession and conflicts. We then introduce the relevant
policy context in Tanzania. Thereafter, we provide a historical
account of investments, conservation and land-use conflicts in
Kilombero, followed by an evaluation of ‘Operation Save Kilo-
mbero’. We end the paper by reflecting on how degradation and
scarcity narratives gloss over political and historical factors in
land-use conflicts.
2. Degradation narratives, dispossession, and conflicts
Competition and conflicts over land in Africa have generally
been increasing during the last few decades (Berry, 2002; Bob,
2010; Peters, 2004, 2009, 2013). Conflicts increase especially in
peri-urban areas, on high-potential agricultural land such as wet-
lands, and in ‘frontier’ areas recently opened up for development
of various kinds (Kröger, 2016; Rasmussen & Lund, 2018). New2 In this article the term ‘smallholder’ refers to both small-scale farmers and
pastoralists. One should note that sometimes the difference between pastoralists and
farmers is not so clear-cut as many ‘pastoralists’ are actually agro-pastoralists
(meaning they also farm).conflicts over land and natural resources may have multiple causes
associated with increasing population pressure due to both natural
population growth and mobility of people, rent-seeking and spec-
ulation, the dispossession of small-scale farmers and pastoralists to
establish, for instance, plantations, forest reserves, national parks,
tourism areas, mines, dams, and residential areas (Peters, 2013;)
as well as processes of formalization to clarify ambiguous legal
right regimes (Benjaminsen, Holden, Lund, & Sjaastad, 2009,
Pedersen, 2016). This variety of parallel and ongoing processes
contribute to what Bluwstein et al. (2018) refer to as the interlock-
ing nature of land alienation. Sometimes, these processes lead to
conflicts, violent or not, over who has formal or moral rights to
manage land.
However, while contestations over who should control land
may have a number of possible causes, governments and interna-
tional institutions tend to subscribe to the idea of dwindling
resources as a fundamental driver of social conflict. This long-
standing, largely neo-Malthusian, view has been articulated in
the scholarly literature seeing resource scarcities as emerging from
three complementary processes: increasing demand, typically due
to population growth; decreasing supply as a result of resource
depletion and environmental degradation; and unequal distribu-
tion of, and access to, resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999). This wide-
spread conception tends to treat scarcity as a constant variable,
while obscuring more laden questions of power, politics and his-
tory (Mehta, 2010). Such questions may reveal the multiple ways
in which scarcity is constructed by paying attention to the politics
of access and control over natural resources, including their histor-
ical dimension (Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Peluso & Lund, 2011). Indeed,
as Mehta (2010) observes, too simplistic cause and effect explana-
tions contributes in diverting attention from more systemic causes
that may compromize the interests of the relatively more
powerful.
More recently, the scarcity narrative has been energized by a
widespread proposition that global warming increases environ-
mental scarcities that again drive conflicts (Hoegh-Guldberg,
Jacob, Taylor, Bindi, Brown, Camilloni, & Zhou, 2018). The interna-
tional attention to this securitization of climate change is found in
particular among policy, military and NGO actors, while relatively
few researchers advocate this proposed link (Selby & Hoffmann,
2014).
In a historical perspective, this may be seen as a new form of
‘climate reductionism’, giving climate the role as the main variable
predicting social change, compared to the ‘climate determinism’ of
the 19th and early 20th century (Hulme, 2011; Raleigh, Linke, &
O’Loughlin, 2014). As in the heydays of climate reductionism, when
the agency of colonial subjects was reduced to being a product of
African climates, there is also a special focus on Africa in today’s
climate reductionism where there is an assumed toxic mix
between population growth, climate change and violent conflicts
over land and natural resources (Kahl, 2006; Homer-Dixon, 2007).
However, despite the prominence of such thinking within pol-
icy and practice, there is little systematic evidence to date that cli-
mate change-induced resource scarcity, in itself, is an important,
general cause of conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014;
Theisen, 2017). A number of African case studies investigating this
link has also concluded on a more prominent role of other causes,
such as the politics of access to resources (Bassett, 1988; Peluso &
Watts, 2001), including rent-seeking by state officials leading to
the marginalization of pastoralists and small-scale farmers
(Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Moritz, 2006;
Turner, 2004). Some studies also discuss how large-scale land
investments may exacerbate land-use conflicts (Ndi & Batterbury,
2017; Peters, 2013; Verhoeven, 2011).
Even so, a simple comparison of regions with a marginal
resource base with regions characterized by endemic political
M. Bergius et al. /World Development 129 (2020) 104850 3violence would reveal a substantial degree of spatial overlap (e.g.,
Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2013) – hence the confusion over
the causal connection between scarcity and conflict. The main rea-
sons for this overlap are two-fold. On the one hand, scarcity, much
like conflict, is often a product of adverse political processes and
poor governance that contribute to escalating social inequalities
and facilitating unsustainable resource use (Benjaminsen,
Maganga, & Abdallah, 2009; Turner, 2004). In that sense, the corre-
lation between scarcity and conflict can be considered partly spu-
rious. On the other hand, prevalent poverty and poor resource
management are often reinforced by political instability and con-
flict, resulting in a vicious and endogenous cycle of marginalization
and conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Gates, Hegre, Mokleiv, & Strand,
2012).
While there is little evidence from both quantitative large-N
studies and qualitative case studies that environmental degrada-
tion and emerging natural resource scarcities drive conflicts, the
idea itself has created a powerful policy narrative that tends to
resist empirical evidence and alternative storylines (Roe, 1999).
In fact, degradation narratives may serve to legitimize elite capture
and the dispossession of smallholders through forms of accumula-
tion by dispossession (Benjaminsen, 2015).3
In development studies, and political ecology in particular,
there has been a renewed interest in the interplay between dispos-
session and capital accumulation (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012;
Büscher, 2009; Corson, 2011; Glassman, 2006; Kelly, 2011; Li,
2010; Roberts, 2008; Shivji, 2008; Sneddon, 2007; Veuthey &
Gerber, 2012). While part of this scholarship focuses on agricul-
tural investments, other contributions show how biodiversity con-
servation in Africa, including in Tanzania, plays a key role in
facilitating and legitimizing dispossession and capital accumula-
tion. Dispossession may be resisted in various ways (Cavanagh &
Benjaminsen, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; Mariki, Svarstad, &
Benjaminsen, 2015), including both open and covert resistance as
well as violence, and resistance may again encourage further vio-
lence from ‘above’. In addition, many interactions and struggles
over natural resources may not necessarily involve resistance in
its various forms, but rather everyday practices of compliance
and adaptation to unequal distribution systems (Cleaver, 2018).
The next section introduces the contemporary Tanzanian policy
context and how it considers the relationship between smallholder
producers, questions of productivity and environmental
degradation.3. The policy context in Tanzania
Since achieving independence in 1961 development policy in
Tanzania has gradually changed from a state-centered towards a
more market-based approach. Still, an important continuity in
most development policy has been the persistent subscription to
an overall discourse of modernization. This continues in strong
force today and is particularly evident in the interlinked policy
areas of agriculture, land and pastoralism.3.1. Agriculture
Tanzania’s long-term vision for development is articulated in its
Vision 2025 (URT, 1999c), which was intended to complement and
underpin the structural adjustment programs that Tanzania3 Harvey (2003, p. 149) defined ‘‘accumulation by dispossession” as enclosing land
‘‘and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then
releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation.”negotiated from 1986 onwards (Hydén & Karlström, 1993; Ponte,
2002). This policy document envisions that by 2025, the Tanzanian
economy will have been ‘‘transformed from a low productivity
agricultural economy to a semi-industrialized one, led by modern-
ized and highly productive agricultural activities which are effec-
tively integrated and buttressed by supportive industrial and
service activities in the rural and urban areas” (URT, 1999c). The
small-scale agricultural sector is described as backward. To help
modernize this sector, the Agricultural Sector Development Pro-
gram (ASDP), launched first in 2006, stakes out the path towards
‘‘a green revolution in Tanzania” according to former president Kik-
wete (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 4).
Alongside the ASDP, a new strategy – Kilimo Kwanza (‘agricul-
ture first’) – was launched in 2009. While the ASDP has been crit-
icized for weakly emphasizing the private sector, the same cannot
be said of Kilimo Kwanza. Largely formulated by the Tanzania Busi-
ness Council, the strategy is described by Cooksey (2013) to pro-
mote the interests of large-scale farmers and represents a break
from the more state-centered and small-scale-focused ASDP. This
was in line with global trends as the financial crisis from 2007
and high food prices prompted new interest in agricultural invest-
ments (Borras, Hall, Scoones, White, & Wolford, 2011).
Kilimo Kwanza was launched with an aim to modernize and
commercialize the agricultural sector and boost private sector
investments, especially via public–private partnerships. Its ‘ten pil-
lar’ road map seeks to exploit synergies between the government
and the private sector in areas such as markets and trade, finance
and agriculture-related infrastructure (TNBC, 2009).
A key initiative geared towards implementing Kilimo Kwanza is
the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)
(See figure 1). Initiated first by president Kikwete at theWorld Eco-
nomic Forum Africa Summit in 2010, SAGCOT is described as a
public–private partnership that seeks to mobilize private invest-
ments across the agricultural value-chain and develop commer-
cially successful and sustainable agriculture in the southern third
of Tanzania. A central component is to integrate (some) small-
holder farmers into agribusiness value-chains, in particular
through various forms of contract farming (SAGCOT, 2011). Still,
such rhetoric of inclusion runs parallel to longer term notions of
‘land mobility’: a process by which land ‘moves’ to supposedly
more efficient, sustainable, and business-oriented producers, while
reducing the overall number of people involved in agriculture
(Bergius & Buseth, 2019; The Guardian, 2017). Of course, the
mobile component here is not the land itself, but rather the people
working it.
By clustering agribusiness actors from both sides of production
in highly fertile areas along key backbone infrastructure, SAGCOT is
expected to deliver development with benefits for food security,
poverty reduction and the environment. For this reason, the gov-
ernment as well as investors and donors have endorsed SAGCOT
as a model for the green economy in Africa, combining commercial
farming operations with environmental conservation (Bergius
et al., 2018; Milder, Buck, Hart, Scherr, & Shames, 2013).4
3.2. Land regulation
A central premise underpinning Kilimo Kwanza and its imple-
mentation via SAGCOT is that Tanzania is ‘gifted’ with ‘underuti-
lized’ land that can be put under more productive use. However,
there are justified concerns to what extent this land is actually4 A key component of this approach (green growth in agriculture) is the
‘sustainable intensification’ of agricultural production. See for example Bergius and
Buseth (2019).
Fig. 1. The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (URT, 2013).
5 Village councils have to administer land in accordance with customary law.
According to the legislation, pastoralists are supposed to stay within Village Land
boundaries. However, the degree to which this is actually implemented varies and is
in many cases practically unsuitable relative to pastoralists need for mobility.
Moreover, communal land rights are poorly recognized as users of such areas are not
entitled to compensation when their land is expropriated.
6 It is important to emphasize, however, that the percentage wise distribution of
the different land categories is highly political and controversial. See for example
Bluwstein et al. (2018).
7 Such views were also provided by the acting director of the Rufiji Basin
Development Authority (Rubada) (a government institution) who complained that
villages have too much power over village land areas, thus making it more difficult
and time consuming to implement investment projects (interview with acting
Director of Rubada, December 12, 2016).
4 M. Bergius et al. /World Development 129 (2020) 104850available, or through which measures it will be made so, to future
investors (Bergius et al., 2018; Boudreaux, 2012; Exner et al., 2015;
Tenga & Kironde, 2012).
The Land Act and Village Land Act of 1999 regulate land tenure
in Tanzania, and were formulated in the wake of widespread land
conflicts, rural discontent and confusion with the land policy amid
the neo-liberalization in the 1980s and 90s. The emerging contra-
dictions between the socialist past and the neoliberal future even-
tually led to the appointment of a Presidential Commission of
Enquiry into Land Matters in 1991.
The commission published its report in 1994 and is regarded as
the most comprehensive resource on land tenure in Tanzania (URT,
1994). The report provided a detailed historical, legal and institu-
tional analysis of the escalating land conflicts and general discon-
tent around land tenure in the country. The Commission
proposed a number of radical recommendations to democratize
land tenure, including divesting the ultimate land title from the
state. Fearing that this would erode state control over land matters
and turn the President into a ‘‘beggar for land” (URT, 1993 in
Sundet, 1997, p. 217), neither the subsequent land policy of 1997
nor the contemporary land acts of 1999 included this recommen-
dation (Nzioki, 2006; Sundet, 2005).
Hence, the legislation retains the President as the ultimate title-
holder of all land. It further categorizes land in three different
classes: Village Land (land found within demarcated or agreed
boundaries of villages and under the administration of Village
Councils), General Land (land administered by central governmentsuch as urban areas and government controlled estates) , and
Reserved Land (such as national parks, game reserves and forest
reserves).5 Of these, General Land, which is the only category of land
accessible to investors, makes up about 2% of the total land area in
Tanzania as well as within SAGCOT (Tenga & Kironde, 2012; URT,
1999a, 1999b).6
There have been sustained calls from within the government to
increase the amount of General Land by transferring land from the
Village Land category (Boudreaux, 2012).7 Once land has been iden-
tified for commercial investment through village land use planning
exercises, the land undergoes a legal shift out of Village Land to Gen-
eral Land status, which is under central government jurisdiction. Vil-
lagers may consent to such transfers in the expectation that future
investments will bring development benefits via infrastructure or
M. Bergius et al. /World Development 129 (2020) 104850 5employment opportunities.8 The government, via the Tanzania
Investment Center (TIC), can in turn sublease the land to investors
for up to 99 years.9 Consequently, power over land control shifts
from village to TIC (central government) and investors, and it
remains in these hands even if the investment does not materialize
(Bluwstein et al., 2018).3.3. Pastoralism
The tendency in development policy to prioritize capital inves-
tors over Tanzanian farmers and pastoralists is associated with
negative views of smallholder producers. As noted by Scoones,
Smalley, Hall, and Tsikata (2014): ‘‘African agriculture is often
depicted as stagnant, underproductive, and a cause of land degra-
dation, in need of revival through integration with large-scale,
commercial operations”. The negative views of smallholders are
even stronger when relating to pastoralists.
Since the colonial period, pastoralists’ need for mobility has
been considered a nuisance by the state, making them particularly
difficult subjects for political control. The main solution proposed
to make pastoralism controllable and taxable – and thus ‘legible’
(Scott, 1998) – has been through projects of sedentarization, often
justified by a combination of environmental and economic con-
cerns (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). Contemporary Tanzanian policy
discourse on pastoralism is an illustrative example of such views
that are in fact representative of how states tend to see pastoralists
(Scott, 1998).
The following quote from former President Kikwete can stand
as an illustration of dominant views of pastoralists among policy-
makers in Tanzania: ‘‘We are producing little milk, export very lit-
tle beef, and our livestock keepers roam throughout the country
with their animals in search for grazing grounds. We have to do
away with archaic ways of livestock farming” (Mattee & Shem,
2006, p. 4). Guided by such modernization ideology, many devel-
opment programs have since independence focused on settling
pastoralists as the way to bring them improved services and eco-
nomic opportunities (Ndagala, 1990).
The main large-scale program to modernize pastoralism in Tan-
zania was the ‘Operation Imparnati’ from the late 1970s, which
was based on the idea that the Maasai were leading a nomadic life
and that they should be settled (Ndagala, 1982). It formed part of
the nationwide villagization program (Operation Vijiji), imple-
mented from the late 1960s, that aimed at the modernization of
traditional agriculture through the resettlement of the rural popu-
lation in concentrated Ujamaa villages (Hodgson, 2001; Kikula,
1997; Scott, 1998).
A good illustration of the official bias against pastoralists in Tan-
zania was demonstrated by the way herders were blamed for the
power crisis in the country in 2006. The government claimed that
overgrazing in the catchment area of the Mtera dam was the main
cause of the water shortage, while the main cause, according to
Walsh (2012), was mismanagement of the reservoir by the
national energy company TANESCO. A full-scale military operation
was launched on 18 May 2006 to evict pastoralists from the
Usangu Plains. A heavily armed combined contingent of regular
police, anti-poaching units and game wardens cleared the Ihefu
Wetland of thousands of pastoralists with up to 300,000 cattle.
The National Livestock Policy of 2006 also reflects this negative
view on pastoralism and aims to ‘modernize’ the livestock sector. It8 It is important to note here that the legislation stipulates that villagers, through
village assemblies, only have an advisory role in land transfers that exceeds 250 ha. In
transfers of less than 250 ha villagers can reject or approve the transfer. In other
words, the power to influence land matters decreases with the land size.
9 There are ongoing discussions about reducing the maximum duration to 33 years
(Bluwstein et al., 2018)seeks to ensure that by 2025 Tanzania has a ‘‘modern, commercial-
ized and sustainable livestock sector with improved income and
ensured food security” (URT, 2006, p. 10).
The bias against pastoralists in these policy discourses is legit-
imized by subscription to long-standing ideas about sustainability
and a conceived mismatch between carrying capacity and livestock
numbers. This ostensible mismatch is underscored by a conception
of sustainable ecosystems as being in a state of equilibrium;
namely, that there are fixed, acceptable, livestock to pasture ratios
that should not be exceeded to avoid degradation and reduced pro-
ductivity. For instance, an environmental and social assessment
produced by SAGCOT estimates that the carrying capacity of live-
stock in Kilombero will be reached in 2020 (URT, 2013).10
In general terms, the concept of carrying capacity is based on
the assumption that plants and animals are or may be in a state
of balance or equilibrium. Two different notions can be identified
(Behnke, Scoones and Kerven 1993; Benjaminsen, Rohde,
Sjaastad, Wisborg, & Lebert, 2006). An ecological carrying capacity
is reached ‘‘when the production of forage equals the rate of its
consumption by animals, and the livestock population ceases to
grow because limited feed supplies produce death rates equal to
birth rates” (Behnke et al. 1993, p. 4). On the other hand, an eco-
nomic carrying capacity sets a theoretical limit, which marks the
number of livestock units pastoral resources in a certain area can
support in order to attain a certain management objective (usually
related to meat or milk production).
Such calculations are based on the assumption that appropriate
stocking rates will result in a balance between grazing pressure
and vegetation succession, which may be a suitable assumption
for stable environments where conditions of plant growth and
reproduction are reliable. However, such stable equilibria seldom
occur in African rangelands, which tend to be in non-equilibrium
where abiotic factors (rainfall, soils) determine vegetation compo-
sition and cover, more than livestock numbers (Behnke et al. 1993;
Scoones, 1994).
The estimate by SAGCOT above lies closer to the definition of
economic carrying capacity as it is clearly based on average feed
requirements of livestock in the area combined with estimates of
available grass per hectare in Kilombero, and not detailed assess-
ments of plant ecological dynamics. Therefore, it cannot be inferred
that exceeding this estimated capacity will lead to degradation.
In addition, ‘degradation’ also remains an elusive concept. One
often gets the impression that degradation can be measured
through scientific methods. But as famously pointed out by
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), ‘degradation’ is a perceptual term
and there will be a number of definitions in any situation. These
different definitions originate from conflicting views on how the
land should be used and what the landscape should look like.
Any discussion about whether or not an area is degraded inevitably
involves actors’ interests, values, and power dimensions
(Benjaminsen, 2015).
Moreover, the negative policy bias towards pastoralists also
tends to undervalue the substantial contribution pastoralism
makes to livelihoods and the national economy. This is why gov-
ernments, such as in Tanzania, try to change pastoral systems
towards ranching or zero-grazing, which is believed to yield higher
productivity (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). However, this disregards
the fact that pastoralists aim to maximize production per unit area,
rather than per animal, as a livelihood strategy in marginal and
variable environments. Research has shown that African pastoral10 This is also reflected in an announcement from the Morogoro Regional Commis-
sioner from 2016 which orders district authorities to ‘‘stop arbitrary influx of
livestock” into the region to stay within the set carrying capacity (Announcement by
Stephen Kebwe, Morogoro Regional Commissioner, titled ‘‘Tamko la zuio la uingizaji
holela wa mifugo mkoani Morogoro”, May 20, 2016).
6 M. Bergius et al. /World Development 129 (2020) 104850systems can be up to ten times more productive per unit area com-
pared to ranching (Grandin, 1987). Moreover, Behnke (2008), for
example, notes that governments often take inaccurate account
of the ways in which pastoralism contributes to national econo-
mies. In addition to producing meat for the market, pastoralism
contributes by providing farming inputs as well as being a vital
source of capital and savings (Behnke, 2008).
Tanzania ranks third in Africa after Sudan and Ethiopia in terms
of livestock production and the livestock sector has a better growth
elasticity than cereal and cash-crop production, according to Engida,
Guthiga, and Karugia (2015). MacGregor and Hesse (2013), how-
ever, point out that data on pastoral production in East Africa are
unreliable, but based on available data they estimate the contribu-
tion of livestock to GDP at about 30%. They also argue that pastoral
production systems in East Africa are very cost effective compared
to other livestock-based systems (ranching and zero-grazing), using
low cost family labor and natural pastures as inputs.
The Kilombero Valley has been singled out as one of the core
areas for SAGCOT related interventions. Its high fertility soil com-
bined with rich biological diversity have made it a sought-after
location for both agribusiness and conservation interests as well
as smallholder producers. However, this is not only a recent trend.
The next section provides some historical context to the growing
squeeze between different land use interests that over time have
turned Kilombero into a national ‘hotspot’ for land conflicts.
4. Kilombero: investments, conservation and conflicts
The Kilombero valley’s vast river system, seasonal flooding and
fertile alluvial soils have contributed to the perception of the valley
as being enriched with high potential for agricultural development.
Colonial travelers passing through the valley in the 19th century
described the local agricultural systems as highly productive and
diverse (Kjekshus, 1996). Kilombero and its surroundings, consid-
ered Thomson (1881),
. . .is one of the most fertile spots in Africa. All the cereals of the
coast, such as rice (the favourite food), millet, and maize, are
grown extensively. So also are such vegetables as sweet pota-
toes, yams, ground-nuts, melons, pumpkins and cucumbers,
and many other excellent articles of food. Tobacco is grown very
abundantly. The sugar-cane, the castoroil plant, and cotton, are
also cultivated (p. 189).4.1. Colonial development plans
The assumed latent wealth of the Kilombero flood plains
enthused both the German and British colonial administrations.
Several surveys were conducted under both administrations that
evaluated the prospects of opening up the valley via railway con-
struction and agricultural projects. The report of the German
Rufiji-Nyassa Expedition acclaimed the potential of establishing a
large-scale irrigation system, asserting that ‘‘if fully utilized”, the
Kilombero lowlands could ‘‘supply rice for the whole protec-
torate”.11 Subsequent British proposals were more restrictive as to
the actual agronomic potential and economic viability of large-
scale projects due to concerns about soil fertility in the central parts
of the valley around the Kilombero River (Telford, 1929). Still, in the
1950s, the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) explored oppor-
tunities for large-scale mechanical cultivation of rice and sugar in
the interior parts of Kilombero.12 Also in the 1950s, an FAO recon-11 Tanzania National Archives. File 13304 ‘‘Development of Kilombero Area”.
12 Tanzania National Archives. File 40511/12 ‘‘CDC Projects – Kilombero Valley
Agricultural Development 1950”naissance survey of the Rufiji Basin proposed – in line with the pre-
vious German plans – large-scale irrigation and flood control
development over 824,000 acres on the Kilombero plains (Jätzold,
1968).
Despite the number of investigations, few large projects mate-
rialized. In a context of international economic uncertainty,
explained by the two world wars and the 1930s recession, the
risks associated with the significant capital investments needed
to transform the valley and accommodate the objectives of the
colonial powers were found to be too large (Larson, 1976;
Monson, 1991). A notable exception were the outer parts of the
valley, where links to transportation infrastructure were more
developed. With funds from among others CDC, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,
construction of the Kilombero Sugar Company (KSC) started in
1960 on about 25,000 acres of land acquired by the company
(Jätzold, 1968).
KSC was nationalized after independence, and later privatized
under South-African based Illovo Sugar in 1998 (Sulle & Smalley,
2015). From the outset, the company supplemented its plantation
farming with an out-grower program linking surrounding small-
and medium cane growers to KSC’s processing facilities.
4.2. Migration and forced resettlement in Kilombero
The prospects of wage labor at KSC were a significant pull factor
for in-migration to Kilombero. The workers hired by KSC came pri-
marily from the highland regions surrounding the valley. They
were attracted not only by the wage labor opportunities at the
company, but also by the possibility to establish farms and settle
down in the area (Martiniello, 2016, Monson, 2011). The lack of
communication infrastructure left the more interior parts of the
valley relatively disconnected from these changes. However, this
changed with the construction of the Tanzania Zambia Railway
Authority (Tazara) system in the 1970s. The Tazara had a transfor-
mative influence on mobility and settlement throughout the valley
and opened up access to areas of fertile farmland that had previ-
ously been difficult to reach (Monson, 2011).
The completion of Tazara in 1974 coincided with the socialist
government’s villagization campaign. Villagization in the Tazara
corridor was enacted through ‘Kando Kando ya Reli’ (Operation
Alongside the Railway), which formally established new villages
alongside the railway. People who were resettled were to be ‘‘edu-
cated in a modern and economic fashion”, while at the same time
ensuring the railway’s security (Monson, 2011, p. 73).
Resettlement was not new to the people of Kilombero. The
villagization campaign was just one in a longer sequence of
resettlement programs carried out both before and after inde-
pendence. The British set out to resettle people in concentrated
villages under the close administration of tribal chiefs to facili-
tate more effective colonial administration and tax collection.
Many families were relocated by force, and a number of homes
of the families that refused to resettle into designated villages
were set on fire. In the 1940s close to 40,000 people were relo-
cated to new settlements, formally as part of attempts to control
sleeping sickness (Monson, 1991, 2011). In 1962, a new scheme
sought to clear towns of undesirable ‘surplus populations’ by
resettling them in Kilombero to take up sugar cane farming as
out-growers connected to KSC. Hence, as Monson (2011, p.77)
writes, many people in Kilombero viewed villagization in the
1970 s not ‘‘as something new and modern, but as something
old and familiar.”
Under ‘Kando Kando ya Reli’ people were resettled from dis-
persed settlements on the plains alongside the tributaries of the
Kilombero River to new plots near the railway. The operation
was subject to the use of strong force and while many eventually
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activities on the plains.13 The forceful removal of people from the
plains also opened up opportunities for in-migrating newcomers to
make use of the ‘abandoned’ farming plots on the plains, thus
prompting land conflicts upon the return of the previous owners.14
The new mobility enabled by the railway line facilitated new
demands for farming land towards the inner areas of Kilombero.
The rapid land conversion to sugar cane production around KSC
made plots for food production to be in short supply. This – com-
bined with the valley’s encirclement by two wildlife reserves put-
ting further strains on available farming space (Monson, 2011;
Neumann, 2001) – prompted sugar cane out-growers, wage labor-
ers and others to travel by railway to more distant areas for food
production. Indeed, this form of ‘commuter farming’ remains wide-
spread in the valley today (Smalley, 2014).
Tanzania’s neo-liberalization in the 1990s also contributed to
this migration pattern. Increasing land pressures combined with
the withdrawal of various agricultural support measures pushed
poorer farmers out of crop production in the southern highland
areas. The lowland areas of Kilombero accommodated many of
these farmers as the fertile alluvial soils were able to support
diverse crop production without significant investments of capital
(Monson, 2011).16 As of today, there are no out-growers linked with the Mngeta Farm. The future of
the plantation itself is also uncertain with the operating firm – Agrica – on the brink
of bankruptcy and looking for buyers.
17 Some of these people were allocated new land within the planned operation area
of the Mngeta Farm. The redevelopment of the farm since 2007 has led to a new
eviction and resettlement round for these people, aptly illustrating the intensifying4.3. Agribusiness investments
The railway’s presence also gave new impetus to the long-
standing plans of developing large-scale agricultural enterprises
in Kilombero. In the mid-1980s, the North-Korean and Tanzanian
governments started a joint venture – Korea Tanzania Company
(Kotaco) that envisioned developing 15,000 ha of irrigated rice
plantations (Kotaco, 1986). However, lack of financial resources
combined with the fact that some of the projected areas were
already heavily populated prompted the company to concentrate
on developing in excess of 5,000 ha in Mngeta (Mngeta Farm). Of
these, only about half were cleared and planted before the com-
pany left in 1993 (Kotaco, 1994).
The same year, Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) planted
its first 24 ha of what today amounts to 7,500 ha of teak planta-
tions. KVTC holds an additional 20,000 ha intended to be used
for sustainable off-take (e.g. fuelwood collection and charcoal pro-
duction) or conservation of evergreen habitat (Bonnington,
Weaver, & Fanning, 2009; Johansson & Isgren, 2017).
With its strategic location along the Tazara, Kilombero repre-
sents today one of the six priority agribusiness investment areas
– the SAGCOT clusters – that have been targeted for commercial
development by the government and the private sector (SAGCOT,
n.d.). Under SAGCOT, a number of new large-scale investments
are planned in Kilombero. One of SAGCOT’s flagship projects is
the UK based company Agrica, which acquired the defunct Mngeta
Farm in 2007 and was later incorporated as a SAGCOT partner
(Bergius et al., 2018). The re-development of this rice plantation
has led to significant conflicts and dispossession of smallholder
farmers and pastoralists, who utilized the land both before and
after its initial establishment in 1986 (Bergius et al., 2018; Greco,
2016). Attempts to incorporate some of these and other surround-
ing farmers into an out-grower scheme have been largely unsuc-
cessful. Participating rice farmers complained of disagreements
over paddy prices as well as severe logistical issues surrounding
the timing of production loans and input distribution,15 while com-13 Interviews with village elders in Mchombe and Lukolongo villages, 2016 and
2017; See also Monson, 2011.
14 Interview with village elder, Mchombe Village, June 20, 2017.
15 Interviews with smallholder associations in Mchombe, Lukolongo, Mkangawalu,
Udagaji and Njagi villages, February and March 2017.pany documents indicate that many out-growers struggled to repay
their loans (Bergius et al., 2018; KPL, 2015).164.4. Conservation
In addition to an expanding sector of agribusiness investments,
Kilombero is also considered to be of high biodiversity value as
Tanzania’s ‘ecological bank’ (Liganga, 2017). British colonialists
tended to see locally adapted practices of minimum tillage and
shifting cultivation – alongside other local economic uses of land
and forests – as a threat to the ecological integrity of the valley.
Combined with commercial timber interests, this prompted the
colonial government to legislate soil conservation rules and erect
forest reserves to combat the ostensible ‘‘dangerous evil” of shift-
ing cultivation and intrinsic ‘‘forest-destroying propensities” of
local tribes (Monson, 1991, p. 346 and 356). In some cases, local
resource users were charged royalties for the felling of large trees
– which they used for the construction of canoes – to ‘‘instill in the
native mind that this timber is valuable and the supplies not inex-
haustible” (Morogoro Forest Department, 1937 in Monson, 1991, p.
344). These policies can be seen to represent the colonial version of
the contemporary introduction of ‘green economy’ in the area.
Furthermore, the entire Udzungwa escarpment to the north and
west of the valley was declared a forest reserve in 1929. The colo-
nial forest conservation policies led to dispossession and less flex-
ible fallow systems, while increasing pressures on land outside the
areas of ‘conservation’. In many instances, as Monson (1991) notes,
the exclusionary forest policies were also subject to contestation
from local resource users who either ignored or refused to comply
with the new regulations.
The Udzungwa forest reserve was incorporated into the
Udzungwa Mountains National Park (UMNP) in 1992. The park
stretches across four administrative districts and covers approxi-
mately 1990 km2 (URT, 2016). Its establishment prompted reset-
tlement of farming populations from the mountain areas to the
Kilombero floodplains (Mung’ong’o & Kayonko, 2009).17 Today,
the UMNP and other protected areas, such as the Selous Game
Reserve, the Kilombero Game Controlled Area and various forest
reserves, comprise around 50% of the total land area of Kilombero
(URT, 2016; Wilson, McInnes, Mbaga, & Ouedraogo, 2017).18 In addi-
tion, after joining the Ramsar convention in 2002, the Tanzanian
government has designated approximately 8,000 km2 to ‘‘conserve
and promote wise use” of the Kilombero wetlands ‘‘towards achiev-
ing sustainable development” (Wilson et al., 2017, p. 1).
With donor support, the implementation of the Kilombero Val-
ley Ramsar Site (KVRS) started in 2012 and falls within an institu-
tional complex that includes all three land categories described by
the Tanzanian land legislation. While the outer KVRS zone com-
prises predominantly Village Land areas and some General Land
(including agribusiness plantations), the inner zone – also defined
as KVRS’s core area –19 intersects with the Kilombero Game Con-
trolled Area (KGCA), which is regulated as Reserve Land under the
Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 (see Fig. 2). However, the exactagribusiness-conservation squeeze in the district (Mung’ong’o & Kayonko, 2009).
18 When the Selous Game Reserve – the largest of its kind in the world – was
established in the 1930s around 40 000 people were evicted (Kjekshus, 1996). Rooke
Johnston, the provincial commissioner of the Southern Province who was in charge of
the evictions, ‘‘held that development depended on the eradication of all human
rights and interests in the areas” (Kjekshus, 1996, p. 178).
19 Interview with Kilombero Ramsar Site project manager in Ifakara, May 12, 2017.
Fig. 2. Study area (to the left) and the Kilombero Valley Ramsar Site Map (KILORWEMP, 2017c). The WMA signature in the legend refers to Wildlife Management Areas.
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core zone – are under negotiation and subject to strong contestation
from local resource users as the proposed boundary realignment
reduces the size of Village Land areas.
Before 2009, there were no direct provisions in the legislation
(Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974) that denied access or use of
land within game-controlled areas or wetlands. However, the
new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 outlaws cultivation and
severely restricts grazing activities within game-controlled areas.
In addition, the new act explicitly prohibits grazing within wetland
reserves, such as the core Ramsar zone in Kilombero. According to
the Director of Wildlife Utilization and Business Services in Tanza-
nia Wildlife Authority (TAWA), who was part of the group author-
ing the new act, ‘‘Kilombero was a key reason for why the Wildlife
Conservation Act of 2009 revised the management of game con-
trolled areas.”20 Possibly due to pressure from conservation inter-
ests, who have complained of ‘‘lots of human use and very little
conservation” within game-controlled areas in the past
(KILORWEMP, 2017c, p. 63), the new act was used to restrict access
rights for farmers and pastoralists to the wetland without compen-
sation. This, in combination with the proposed boundary realign-
ment, has resulted in a dispute involving the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Tourism and more than hundred villages that have
part of their village land within the core Ramsar zone. With assis-
tance from the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) the villages
have brought the dispute to the land division of the High Court.2120 Interview with Director of Wildlife Utilization and Business Services in TAWA,
Imai R. Nkuwi. October 3, 2017.
21 On February 22, 2018, the local representative of the Legal and Human Rights
Center, Godfrey Lwena, who represented the villagers in court was brutally killed
outside of his home in Kilombero by a group of masked men armed with machetes.
The general opinion in Kilombero is that Lwena was killed due to his active
involvement and resistance against cases of dispossession.4.5. Kilombero: agribusiness, conservation and a ‘hotspot’ for land
conflicts
The combination and expansion of agricultural capital invest-
ments and conservation, alongside in-migration, have contributed
to growing land pressures in Kilombero in recent years. This leaves
smallholder farmers and pastoralists in a tight squeeze between
different powerful national and international agribusiness and
conservation interests that have turned Kilombero into a national
‘hotspot’ for land conflicts (Mhegera, 2012).
Figure 3 shows the number of land-use conflicts reported to the
police in Kilombero as criminal offences since 2000, meaning that
there has been use of violence. These conflicts are diverse – includ-
ing among farmers, between farmers and pastoralists and between
villagers and conservation authorities – and symptomize a growing
instance of relative land scarcity in the region. Note, in particular,
the increase in reported conflicts between villagers and conserva-
tion areas in recent years. These are likely linked to the legislative
changes and realignment of the core Ramsar zone boundary.
A recent land use analysis asserts that about 40% of the land
within the core Ramsar area was under cultivation in 2016
(KILORWEMP, 2017a). This suggests that in a context of relative
land scarcity smallholders are inclined to resist via non-
compliance to the regulative changes concerning wetland areas.
Violation of the core Ramsar zone boundary is partly also a
direct result of dispossession and resettlement resulting from
agribusiness investments associated with SAGCOT. Many of the
smallholders who were dispossessed by Agrica’s re-development
of the Mngeta Farm, for instance, received compensation land
within the core Ramsar conservation area.22 As a result, many of
these were evicted a second time by what they referred to as ‘‘Ram-
sar people” and were left either landless or forced to rent land from22 In addition, due to yearly floods the compensation land is in most years not
usable.
Fig. 3. Number of land-use conflicts as criminal offence. Source: Ifakara Police
Station.
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visualized in Fig. 2, data from the local land tribunal show that the
number of conflicts between farmers in this area has increased sub-
stantially since 2007.24 This corroborates Greco (2016, p. 32) obser-
vation that there has been an ‘‘escalation of land disputes” in the
villages surrounding the plantation since the new investor arrived.
The contemporary cycle of material expansion in international
capital investments (Kröger, 2013, 2016) – driven in part by the
green economy 25– has reinforced old and created new contentious
encounters between intertwined conservation and agribusiness
interests and local resource users in Kilombero. Indeed, capital
intensive agro-investments, alongside increasing areas under con-
servation, lie at the crux of the green growth approach to agriculture
(Bergius & Buseth, 2019; Milder et al., 2013; WEF, 2011). This
approach operates according to an ontology that tends to treat land-
scapes of production as mutually exclusive to landscapes of biodi-
versity conservation. Resource users deemed not to fit to this
vision of development face exclusion in attempts to purify space
for the green economy. In this space, pastoralists, in particular, are
considered disturbing elements.5. Pastoralists and Evictions: ‘Operation save Kilombero’
There are divergent historical accounts of cattle herding in Kilo-
mbero Valley. After travelling through the area in the late 19th
century, Stolowsky (1903 in Kjekshus, 1996), for example, reported
that Kilombero ‘‘offer such good conditions for stock-breeding that
they could hardly be imagined to be more favourable”. In the val-
leys’ South-Western parts, Stolowsky wrote, the local ruler ‘‘pos-
sesses a splendid looking herd of cattle which thrives
marvellously (in the area)” (p. 60). In sharp contrast, von Prince
(1897 in Monson, 1991) reported from his journey that there were
no cattle at all in the valley, while Telford (1929) asserted that cat-
tle keeping ‘‘is generally impossible because of tsetse fly”. As
Monson (1991) notes, these diverging accounts are likely rooted
in the fact that overall cattle numbers in the valley have remained
quite low due to a variety of ecological risks, and, in part, colonial
policies that restricted flexibility and mobility of herders (see also
Neumann, 2001).23 Interviews with villagers in Kichangani hamlet, Isago village, February 2017.
24 The Mchombe Ward Land Tribunal was established in 2005.
25 As evidenced particularly by new ‘climate-smart’ investment opportunities in
minerals (Dunlap, 2018), forests (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012; Kröger, 2014), or
agriculture (Bergius et al., 2018; Newell & Taylor, 2018).Yet, historical evidence suggests that cattle herding has been
present to various extent since mid- to late 19th century (Jätzold,
1968; Monson, 1991). Jätzold (1968) reports that early in-
migrators (Wabena) from the surrounding highlands brought an
unknown number of livestock to the Kilombero plains around
1910. According to the International Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs (IWGIA) (2016), Parakuyo-Maasai pastoralists have been
present in Kilombero since around the same time. In 1965,
Jätzold (1968) notes, the stock of cattle in Kilombero Valley was
thought to be around 2,000, however, ‘‘if anything”. . . these figures
were ‘‘too low rather than too high” (p. 67). Alienated from their
lands by large-scale farming projects, Datoga (Barabaig) pastoral-
ists are said to have arrived in Kilombero from Hanang in the
1970s, while Sukuma and Maasai (other than Parakuyo) pastoral-
ists arrived more recently, in the 1990s, in search of pastures and
farm land (IWGIA, 2016; KILORWEMP, 2017b).
Recent in-migration of pastoralists to Kilombero is also linked
to a series of evictions in southern Tanzania since the turn of the
millennium (Benjaminsen et al., 2009; IWGIA, 2016;
KILORWEMP, 2017b; Walsh, 2012). This includes, in particular,
the aforementioned ‘National Anti-Livestock Operation’ that was
carried out in 2006 and 2007 to evict pastoralists from the
Usangu/Ihefu wetlands in Mbeya Region. Although accurate figures
are lacking, livestock development officers at the Kilombero Dis-
trict claim that a vast proportion of ‘new’ pastoralists in the valley
came from Usangu/Ihefu.26 Combined, the series of eviction opera-
tions in recent decades have reinforced conflicts over land and
resources in Kilombero between pastoralists and farmers, agribusi-
ness investors and conservation interests (KILORWEMP, 2017b;
Wilson et al., 2017).
In Kilombero, such conflicts coincide with seasonal climatic
variations. Farmer-herder conflicts, for example, intensify during
wet season, when large parts of the plains are flooded and pastoral-
ists move cattle out of the plains to where most farming activities
take place. Likewise, conflicts between pastoralists and the Ramsar
conservation area intensify during the dry season, when access to
water and grazing pastures on the plains is more significant
(KILORWEMP, 2017b).
According to the dominant narrative, in-migrating pastoralists
are the ones who have the main responsibility for inciting such
conflicts. They are thought to be ‘invaders’ whose livelihood activ-
ities are believed to cause widespread environmental degradation
and thus not fitting to a ‘modern’ and land intensive green econ-
omy (IWGIA, 2016; Milder, Hart & Buck, 2013; Wilson et al.,
2017). The severity of the issue is buttressed by government offi-
cials constructing alarmist future scenarios, in which ‘‘almost all
unique natural resources [in the Kilombero Valley]” are destined
to disappear within years if action is not taken (PINGOs Forum. ,
2013, p. 8-9). The national media actively proliferate this reason-
ing: ‘‘. . .efforts to conserve the Kilombero valley flood plains are
being frustrated by the invasion of the valley by livestock keepers
where their volume of cattle has exceeded the carrying capacity of
the area” (Liganga, 2017). Although this environmental degrada-
tion narrative is unsubstantiated and not supported by scientific
research or evidence, it has become the most commonly used jus-
tification for evicting pastoralists.
In 2012, alongside the implementation and realignment of the
core Ramsar zone, the government initiated a major operation to
evict pastoralists from Kilombero. Epitomized by the language of
environmental degradation, ‘Operation Save Kilombero Valley’
was launched on October 30, officially to save the wetland
ecosystem from pastoral overstocking, but also to align with the
state-assigned goal of making the region a national grain hub via26 Interview with Livestock Officer, Kilombero District, May 11, 2017.
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police officers, six prison officers, 37 militias, 30 village wildlife
officers and 16 game officers (The Guardian, 2013). The day after
the operation was launched, pastoralists from 51 villages in the
Kilombero Valley filed a case in the Land Division of the High Court
to contest the eviction order and its implementation. In response,
the High Court issued an injunction order to stop government offi-
cials from continuing the exercise until the case was determined
by the court.
However, the operation continued in spite of the court’s injunc-
tion. After having removed an alleged 280,000 out of 320,000 cattle
from Kilombero, government authorities in January 2013 declared
the eviction exercise a success (The Guardian, 2013). In contrast,
pastoralists and civil society organizations held that the operation
was ‘‘accompanied by massive extortion, corruption and disposses-
sion of pastoralists’ livestock assets, as well as extensive violation
of human rights, including arbitrary arrests and killings” of pas-
toralists by military and police forces (IWGIA, 2016, p. 24). Accord-
ing to IWGIA (2016), 5,000 pastoralists were evicted with no
compensation or alternative options provided. Moreover, the same
organization claims that the operation was a money-making exer-
cise for those carrying it out as pastoralists reported being fined
multiple times for different reasons. An estimated US$ 427.000
were said to be levied in fines, while only US$ 6000 were formally
declared (IWGIA, 2016). Indeed, this illustrates the potential vested
interests of some state actors in upholding and proliferating degra-
dation narratives as part of a rent-seeking strategy.
In spite of the eviction exercise, pastoralists have maintained a
strong presence in Kilombero. After eviction, many pastoralists
have returned with their livestock. When asked about possible rea-
sons for this, the Kilombero District Livestock Officer explained it
was because ‘‘Kilombero is very productive”. While the Livestock
Officer also repeated the overgrazing narrative, she admitted that
claims of overgrazing were only based on ‘‘a visual assessment”
without any research or monitoring.27 Moreover, a continued
strong presence of pastoralists in the valley would be impossible if
overgrazing in an ecological sense was an issue. Nevertheless, in
2016, the Morogoro Regional Commissioner ordered district author-
ities to again evict ‘‘invading” smallholders from the wetland areas
on ecological grounds to ‘‘ensure that the valley which is among
major elements of the national heritage is protected” (The
Guardian, 2016).
The Kilombero evictions, alongside recent and similar anti-
pastoral operations elsewhere, have resulted in the spill-over of
pastoralists to new areas (IWGIA, 2016; PINGOs Forum. , 2013;
Walsh, 2012). Although pastoralists are told to leave, they are sel-
dom told where to go, signifying the severe lack of foresight on
behalf of the state in the way these operations are managed. A
large share has migrated with their livestock to districts in the
Coast Region (PINGOs Forum. , 2013; Walwa, 2017). At the back-
drop of ‘Operation Save Kilombero’ Tanzanian media reported that
villagers in Kisarawe District, were ‘‘up in arms against livestock
keepers. . .flocking” to the area from Kilombero Valley (PINGOs
Forum. , 2013, p. 24). Meanwhile, many ward and district leaders
issued strict warnings to pastoralists coming from the Morogoro
Region that they were not welcome to their constituencies
(PINGOs Forum. , 2013).
The spill-over of pastoralists has reinforced conflicts over land
and resources in these areas, in particular between farmers and
herders (Walwa, 2019).28 These conflicts are intensified not only
by in-migrating pastoralists in search of pastures, but also by parallel
processes of land investment preparation (Bélair, 2018; Walwa,27 Interview with Livestock Officer, Kilombero District, October 6, 2017.
28 Interview with Director General, National Land Use Planning Commission,
October 9, 2017.2017). The Coast Region falls within the geographical zone of SAG-
COT and is attractive to agribusiness investors due to its fertile land,
rivers and relative proximity to markets (SAGCOT, 2011). In Kis-
arawe and Rufiji districts, for example, village land use planning
has been an important tool utilized by the government to identify
and prepare land for investments. According to Walwa (2017), land
use plans in these districts have themselves become sources of con-
flict in the way capital investments appear to be prioritized over
tenure security for smallholder farmers and pastoralists. Consider-
able tracts of land have been identified and allocated for invest-
ments, thereby pushing relative land scarcity and intensifying
farmer-herder conflicts, sometimes with deadly outcomes (Bélair,
2018; Walwa, 2019). The combination of such parallel processes sig-
nifies the interlocking nature of land conflicts and alienation in Tan-
zania (Bluwstein et al., 2018).
As such conflicts intensify, partly as a result of pastoralist spill-
over from elsewhere, the environmental degradation narratives
linked to pastoralism are again reproduced (Walwa, 2019). This
adds newmomentum to the continuous cycle of evictions, conflicts
and migration Tanzanian pastoralists are imbricated in. The arrival
of the green economy to areas such as Kilombero can thus be seen
to amplify this historical pattern.
6. Concluding remarks
In this contribution we have illustrated the real, material link
that exists between narratives of environmental degradation and
scarcity and their concrete effects on land and natural resource
struggles. Such struggles and conflicts are legitimized and largely
driven by long-standing and powerful policy narratives about
resource scarcities that are unsubstantiated and poorly docu-
mented empirically and often blind to historical processes of dis-
possession and injustice.
As Scoones, Smalley, Hall, and Tsikata (2018) have recently
pointed out in the context of ‘the global land rush’, scarcity narra-
tives are not merely descriptive storylines, but are constructed,
proliferated and adopted with a purpose. They are used actively
to legitimize concrete interventions in natural resource manage-
ment in which certain resource users and future pathways are pri-
oritized over others. Inevitably, policy narratives yield concrete
and material outcomes with clear winners and losers.
In the context of our discussion on these matters in Kilombero,
the power of dominant policy narratives on degradation and scar-
city relative to alternative storylines, portrays smallholders (pas-
toralists in particular) as the antagonists to sustainable
development: Their productivity is low and their methods of pro-
duction are depicted as a major cause of environmental degrada-
tion and emerging resource scarcities. This has, ultimately,
prompted evictions, dispossession and increased instances of
land-use conflicts. Moreover, the spill-over of pastoralists from
such evictions to new areas has led to new land-use conflicts, while
reproducing the policy narratives that contributed to them in the
first place.
These narratives of degradation and scarcity often co-exist
alongside narratives of natural resource abundance (Scoones
et al., 2018). In contemporary mainstream green economy visions
these seemingly contrasting positions are mutually reinforced
through an ontological divide between production and conserva-
tion landscapes.. Said differently, to conserve remaining nature,
while meeting growing demands for food and agricultural produc-
tion, human land use needs to intensify. In this equation, small-
holder farmers and pastoralists are deemed lacking in terms of
knowledge, technology and capital. Removing some of these dis-
turbing elements via military style ‘operations’ is thus considered
vital to render land both investable (Li, 2017) and conservable in
a green economy.
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prompted growing sectors of both conservation and agribusiness
capital investments. With the arrival of the green economy to Kilo-
mbero, this agribusiness-conservation ‘squeeze’ smallholder farm-
ers and pastoralists find themselves entangled in risks intensifying
even further. This signifies the way in which perceptions of degra-
dation and scarcity are manufactured (Mehta, 2001) as part of a
knowledge politics to suit and justify powerful national and inter-
national interests. This political-ness of scarcity is systematically
downplayed, thereby masking how distribution of access and con-
trol over natural resources is imbricated in historical processes of
exploitation and injustice.
The apparent ‘scarcity’ of politics and history denotes the wider
discourse of modernization that undergirds the green economy
and contemporary development policy in Africa.Declaration of Competing Interest
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